But there are two cases in which A comes strictly from or out of B, that in which B retains its substantial nature but develops, and that in which B disappears and its substratum takes on a new and opposite substantial nature. The second case is γένεσις proper; the first may be either change of quantity (αὔξησις), as when a boy becomes a man, or of quality (ἀλλοίωσις), as when an ignorant person becomes learned. But it is not coextensive with αὔξησις and ἀλλοίωσις : Aristotle is thinking only of those cases in which the change is development towards an end (τελείωσις) and cannot be reversed (I. 32).
https://archive.org/details/aristotlesmetaph0001aris/page/217/mode/1up
No comments:
Post a Comment